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The first, and often the hardest, step in any defence policy is to define strategic objectives—
what we want our armed forces to be able to do.  This is especially hard for a country like 
Australia, because most of the circumstances in which we would rely on the Australian Defence 
Force most heavily are only credible if the international order in Asia were to have changed 
significantly.  How can we decide what we would want our armed forces to do in a region very 
different from the one we know today?  This problem has become more acute since the early 
1990s, because the end of the Cold War and the rise of China have increased the probability of 
major systemic change in Asia.  This essay explores an approach to identifying long-term 
strategic objectives in these circumstances.  The approach it is based on a specific conception 
of strategic interests, defined as those factors in the international order that significantly affect 
the likelihood or seriousness of armed attack on Australia.  This essay also describes how this 
approach was developed in the 1990s and applied in the 2000 White Paper, and considers its 
applicability in future defence policy.       
Setting Strategic Objectives 
Any policy process must start with a clear statement of objectives, and the 
clearer the objectives, the better the policy is likely to be.  Defence policy is 
no different.  Decisions about the capabilities required in our armed forces 
have to start from a clear statement of strategic objectives.  In this essay 
(subject to an elaboration that will be introduced later) I will use this phrase 
to mean, specifically, the policy goals that we want to be able to achieve 
through the use of our armed forces.  Obviously, the more clearly and 
explicitly we can define strategic objectives, the easier it will be to build 
forces that can achieve them, and achieve them cost-effectively.  But it is 
often very hard to give plain and direct answers to the question ‘what do we 
want our armed forces to be able to do?’  Finding those answers and thereby 
defining strategic objectives therefore presents not only the first, but often 
also the greatest, challenge to defence policy. 
The problem is particularly difficult for Australia, because our strategic 
situation is a little peculiar.  Our peculiarity has to do with the risk we face of 
conventional military attack.  Notwithstanding the attention being given to 
other roles for armed force, concern about the risk of conventional military 
attack remains the primary determinant of defence policy, because 
conventional conflict remains the primary purpose for which armed forces 
like Australia’s are organized, trained and equipped.  But our defence 
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planners have always found Australia’s exposure to conventional military 
threat hard to classify   We do not face a clear and present danger of 
conventional military attack, but nor are we inevitably and immutably secure.  
Australia is not one of those countries that face (or believe they face) 
obvious and immediate threats which directly determine their strategic 
objectives – countries like Israel, South Korea, India, Pakistan, Singapore, 
and of course members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War.  
Given the present global and regional order, including the distribution of 
military capability and the probable pattern of national intentions and 
motives, no country is at all likely to project substantial armed force against 
us. 
But neither is Australia among those countries like Canada, New Zealand, 
and the West Europeans, whose security from attack appears to have very 
deep roots in the international order, and who believe that it would require 
radical and highly improbable changes in world affairs for the foundations of 
this security to crack.  For them, strategic objectives no longer relate to the 
security of their territory from military attack, but to wider security, diplomatic, 
political or humanitarian purposes.  Their policies often pay lip-service to 
defence against conventional attack, because of the deep (and correct) 
instinct among voters and decision-makers that this is what armed forces are 
for.  But in the absence of credible scenarios in which such a threat could 
emerge, the formulation of coherent strategic objectives becomes difficult.  
Fortunately that does not matter much: provided they are right that the risk of 
military attack is so low, the consequences of poor defence policy are 
unlikely to be severe. 
Australia’s security from conventional attack is not as well-founded as 
Canada’s or Belgium’s.  It depends on a large number of contingent features 
of the current regional order which could quite credibly change in coming 
years in ways that would sharply increase the likelihood of direct threat 
against us.  This is what gives Australian defence policy its distinctive 
flavour.  We have a strategic environment which, to our great good fortune, 
has been remarkably benign for the past few decades.  As long as the 
international order in Asia remains much as it has for the past thirty or forty 
years, we will remain highly secure from armed attack.  But relatively 
challenging minor threats could emerge with little change in the wider 
regional order, and our security could be much more seriously threatened by 
larger changes which are not in themselves very unlikely.  That is why, 
unlike Canada and New Zealand, and despite recent decades of security, we 
have always maintained a strong focus on the of our territory.  It has shaped 
Australia’s approach to defence planning, producing two divergent strands.  
One strand has addressed the modest threats that could still emerge with 
little change to Australia’s strategic environment, such as the low level 
contingencies which absorbed so much attention in the 1980s. The other has 
addressed the risk that the wider international order that underpinned that 
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benign strategic environment might change, bringing new and more 
demanding challenges. 
This second strand of policy has received less overt attention than the first, 
but for decades one of the core underlying issues in Australian defence 
debates has been how seriously to take the risk of major systemic change in 
our strategic environment.1  This was evident even in the 1980s. When one 
looks at the key force-structure choices of that time, such as the F-18s and 
Collins submarines, it is clear that defence planners had a lot more on their 
minds than low-level contingencies involving Indonesia.  Those capabilities 
related to threats of a scale that could only have emerged if the international 
order had changed significantly.  But the issue became more marked after 
the end of the Cold War, because the potential for major systemic change in 
Asia seemed to grow with the collapse of the strategic framework imposed 
by the Cold War, and with the rise of China.  Today the most important 
differences over the future direction of Australian defence policy tend to 
derive from different views of the likelihood and consequences of major 
systemic change in Asia over coming decades.  Some argue there is little or 
no risk that the international order will change in ways that would increase 
the threat of conventional military attack on Australia.  For them the problem 
of setting strategic objectives involves deciding which of the various security 
challenges we face within the current international order—global warming, 
terrorism, state failure, WMD proliferation and others—most deserve or 
require the application of armed force.  But for those who believe there is a 
significant risk that systemic change in Asia might increase conventional 
military threats, the problem of how armed forces should best be developed 
to address that risk is the key question of defence policy.  For them, the key 
question is what we might want Australia’s armed forces to be able to do 
against threats which are different from, and greater than, those that seem 
currently credible.  This was an important subject of debate within some 
parts of the Department of Defence in the 1990s, and was the focus of much 
of the thinking behind the 2000 Defence White Paper.  The challenge 
essentially was to identify the strategic objectives we might want the 
Australian Defence Force (ADF) to be able to achieve if the future brings 
something rather different from the world, and especially the Asia-Pacific 
region, we know today.    
One quite credible school of thought argues that the problem is insuperable.  
They say that attempts by successive White Papers to predict the future 
have always failed and always will, an that the best we can do therefore is to 
build ‘flexible’ forces that will give us some useful options whatever happens.  
                                                 
1 The doctrine of warning time, upon which so much emphasis was placed in the 1970s and 
1980s, is best seen as being in large measure a response to this problem, as becomes clear 
when one looks for example at the treatment of the concept in the Dibb Review: Paul Dibb, 
Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 1986), p. 32. 
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I have recently argued elsewhere2 that this approach to defence policy has 
two flaws.  First, the flexible force is unlikely to be able to deal effectively 
with many of the most serious threats we may face, so we avoid the problem 
of trying to predict the future only at the price of being unable to prepare for 
it.  Second, it underestimates our ability to find, in the shifting sands of future 
uncertainly, some firm ground on which to base our long-term plans.  This 
essay aims to explore this second issue.  It argues that, properly conceived 
and developed, the concept of strategic interest can provide a reliable and 
durable foundation for long-term defence planning by allowing us to identify 
long-term strategic objectives which will remain valid even if systemic 
change in the international order brings new, different and greater threats. 
Strategic Interests and Strategic Objectives  
What do I mean here by a strategic interest?  The phrase is often used 
rather loosely, but here it needs to be more narrowly defined.  Let’s start with 
a broad conception of national interest, which can cover everything about the 
world that affects Australia’s well-being.  In this sense our national interests 
cover everything from the workings of the global economic order and access 
to markets for our exports, to a just and sustainable solution to the Darfur 
problem and the protection of the Antarctic wilderness.  Within this broad 
concept of national interests also we can identify a narrower category of 
security interests.  How large this category is depends on how widely we 
define ‘security’.  Today security is properly conceived quite broadly, 
covering many kinds of threat including economic, environmental, criminal 
and natural hazards.  Many of these however have little or nothing to do with 
armed force, so to get at the interests that should drive defence policy we 
need to define a still narrower category: a subset of security interests that we 
can properly call strategic interests.  These are the interests which relate to 
the risk of conventional military threats against Australia, and which do so 
sufficiently directly that we might want to use armed force to protect them.3  
Strategic interests are therefore those elements of the international order 
that affect, directly or indirectly, the likelihood or seriousness of an attack 
against us.  They reflect the ways that our vulnerability to attack might be 
increased or decreased by changes to the international system, the 
distribution of power and influence, and the balances of military capabilities. 
                                                 
2 Hugh White, The New Defence White Paper: Why We Need It and What it Needs to Do, Lowy 
Institute Perspective (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, April 2008), pp. 3-4.   
3 A point of clarification.  The narrow conception of strategic interest proposed here does not 
imply that the only purposes for which we might want to use force relate to the risk of 
conventional attack.  Obviously we might want to use armed force to protect wider security 
interests or national interests, if we think such force might be effective and are willing to pay the 
price.  My constrained definition of ‘strategic interest’ implies only that, as we have seen, and 
notwithstanding the range of other tasks, the core purpose of armed force remains responding 
to the risk of military attack.  Working out what kind of forces we need for that purpose thus 
remains the key task of defence planning, and deciding what we would want our armed forces 
to be able to do to manage the risk of direct attack thus remains the central problem in defence 
planning.   
Strategic Interests in Australian Defence Policy: Some Historical and Methodological Reflections 
Volume 4, Number 2 (Winter 2008) - 67 - 
This conception of strategic interests provides a robust foundation for 
identifying strategic objectives.  In general we can say that our strategic 
objectives will be to protect our strategic interests: our purpose will be to 
shape the world in ways that minimise the likelihood or seriousness of 
military threats.  However, the relationship between strategic interests and 
objectives is a little more complex than this.  First, we have to take account 
of the range of different policy instruments available. Clearly there are many 
things we can do to protect our strategic interests other than to use armed 
force.  Diplomacy, aid, and many other instruments will also play a part, and 
often the principal part, in preventing developments which would make us 
more liable to attack.  Force, as always should be a last resort.  We therefore 
need to distinguish between broader and narrower conceptions of strategic 
objective.  National strategic objectives are those that we bring all the 
instruments of policy to bear on.  Military strategic objectives are those we 
want to be able to achieve substantially or primarily through the use of our 
armed forces if necessary.  For defence planners, the narrower concept of 
military strategic objective is the one we need: it covers those things we 
might want to do with armed force to protect our strategic interests.  For 
convenience I will here use strategic objective to refer to this narrower 
concept. 
Second, there is the question of practicality.  Any conception of policy 
objectives must past a test of realistic achievability, and that is especially 
true in defence policy.  There will often be a gap between the factors which 
affect our security from attack and the measures we can take to address 
them.  We have strategic interests which we cannot realistically expect to be 
able to protect with armed force, because we lack the power to do so.  
Hence there will always be strategic interests which we cannot translate into 
strategic objectives.  Indeed it is the perennial fate of small and medium 
powers that their security from attack depends on factors in the international 
system which they have no power to influence, either by military or by other 
means.  For them, good policy aims to maximise their influence, but realism 
requires recognition of its limits.  That means there is a difference between 
identifying a strategic interest and adopting the corresponding strategic 
objective as a basis for defence planning.  This is true even for great powers; 
all defence planning is a matter of finding the equilibrium between our 
concerns about risks and our willingness or ability to pay what is required to 
address them. 
Beyond the Great Debate 
Strategic interests have not received much attention in the development of 
Australian defence policy.  The reason for this can be found, I think, in the 
somewhat constrained binary debate between ‘continental’ and 
‘expeditionary’ schools which under different labels has framed Australian 
defence debates for so long.  Both approaches have discouraged detailed 
reflection on Australia’s strategic interests, because they have both held 
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highly reductionist views of what our strategic interests might be.  The core 
tenet of the expeditionary school has been a belief that Australia’s primary, 
or indeed only, strategic interest is to maintain a strong alliance with a pre-
eminent global power.  This has been seen as a necessary and sufficient 
condition for Australian security.  The expeditionary school has consequently 
seen the sole purposes of Australia’s armed forces – our sole strategic 
objective, in other words - as supporting our allies and strengthening our 
alliances with them.  This idea has had a decisive influence on Australian 
defence policy for much of our history, and has never completely 
disappeared.  
The ‘continental’ school of defence policy, which emerged as the dominant 
strand of Australian policy thinking after Vietnam, took a very different but 
equally reductionist view of Australian strategic interests.  The heart of the 
Defence of Australia (DoA) strategies embodied in the 1976 and 1987 White 
Papers was the idea the ADF should be developed to protect a single 
strategic interest: the defence of the continent itself from direct attack.  There 
is ample scope for debate about whether in the circumstances of the time 
this was the best way to respond to the strategic dynamics of the post-
Vietnam era: my own view is that it had a lot of merit but also real 
limitations.4  There is no doubt however that one of the prime attractions of 
the narrow DoA conception that drove defence policy in the 1970s and 
1980s was the way it provided a clear, simple and durable basis for 
disciplined force planning by identifying the defence of the continent from 
direct attack as our single unambiguous strategic interest. One of the 
reasons why DoA’s champions have clung to it so tenaciously ever since has 
been their conviction that any broader conception of Australia’s strategic 
interests would necessarily forgo the simplicity and clarity, and relax and 
discipline, that this single strategic interest provided. 
But strategic trends take no account of the preferences of policymakers.  
Whatever its attractions in the 1970s and 1980s, by the 1990s the idea that 
Australia’s defence policy could remain focused solely on the defence of the 
continent was under serious pressure.  Regular deployments to the Middle 
East and Africa, increasing stabilisation commitments in Australia’s 
immediate neighbourhood, and the changing strategic dynamics of the Asia-
Pacific all undermined the convenient assumption that forces designed to 
defend the continent would always provide what was needed to meet 
Australia’s strategic objectives further afield.5  Quite early in the 1990s it 
became apparent that we needed to broaden the basis of our defence policy.  
The problem was how to do it. 
                                                 
4 See Hugh White, ‘Four Decades of the Defence of Australia: Reflections on Australian 
Defence Policy over the Past 40 Years’, in Ron Huisken and Meredith Thatcher (eds.), History 
as Policy: Framing the Debate on the Future of Australia’s Defence Policy (Canberra: Australian 
National University E Press, 2007), pp. 163-187. 
5 Ibid. 
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That remains one of the key challenges in Australian defence policy today.  It 
is easy to agree that Australia’s defence policy should encompass more than 
the direct defence of the continent.  The harder part is to say, precisely and 
clearly, what more it should do.  Our aim should be to expand the scope of 
defence policy without losing the clarity and rigour that DoA once provided.  
To do that we need to go beyond a simple assertion that Australia has wider 
interests that need to be protected, and identify what those interests are, 
explain how our armed forces can help defend them, and identify the best 
mix of forces to do so.  The essential first step, obviously, is to build a 
conception of Australia’s strategic interests which goes beyond the over-
simplified approaches of both the continental and the expeditionary poles of 
Australia’s traditional defence debate.  This is not easy.  DoA maintained its 
grip on defence policy for so long because it is so hard to agree on a simple, 
durable and robust, but still concrete and rigorous account of Australia’s 
wider strategic interests that might provide the foundation for a new, wider 
approach to defence planning.   
Help From Pitt and Palmerston 
Where then should we start looking for a more expansive but still rigorous 
understanding of Australia’s strategic interests?  During the early 1990s 
some of us working in Defence began exploring this problem of defining 
Australia’s wider strategic interests in the post-Cold War world.6  Our 
attention was caught by Lord Palmerston’s famous line about ‘Britain having 
no permanent friends and no permanent enemies, only permanent interests.’  
We started to look at how Britain defined these permanent interests, and 
what we might learn from them.  For centuries British policy was guided by a 
view of its strategic interests which had hardly changed from the time of 
Elizabeth I until after World War II, articulated and implemented by men like 
Burleigh, Marlborough, Walpole, Pitt, Wellington, Palmerston and Churchill.  
Their ideas were well-understood by Australia’s first generation of strategic 
policymakers—Alfred Deakin and his contemporaries—who had drawn on 
these British strategic concepts as they started to think about Australia’s 
security in the late nineteenth century.7  To them, and to us, the British 
experience seemed worth examining, not because of historical or 
sentimental connections with the UK, but because of certain geostrategic 
similarities.  Like Australia, Britain is an island lying offshore a continent of 
major powers.  Despite major and important differences, this seemed a 
reasonable place to start.  And the British, having avoided invasion for a 
                                                 
6 Some insight into the earlier thinking about these issues in post-Cold War Australian Defence 
Policy will be found in my forthcoming SDSC Working Paper provisionally entitled 'Australian 
Defence Policy and the End of the Cold War: Three Early Reflections from 1993'. 
7 There are many examples.  See for instance Edmund Barton quoted in Gavin Souter, Lion and 
Kangaroo: the Initiation of Australia (Melbourne: Text Publishing, 2001), p. 155.  John McEwan 
said very much the same thing in November 1941: W.J. Hudson and H.J.W. Stokes (eds.), 
Documents in Australian Foreign Policy 1937-1949, Volume V, July 1941-June 1942 (Canberra: 
Department of Foreign Affairs, 1982), p. 180.   
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nearly a thousand years, seemed to be getting something right.  They had 
developed a strong, coherent sense of their key strategic interests which had 
endured with little change for centuries, providing a durable guide to 
generations of policymakers.  That was the kind of thing we were after.  
The enduring formulation of Britain’s ‘permanent’ strategic interests is 
deceptively simple.  It has three elements.  First, Britain has always been at 
pains to ensure that her maritime forces could dominate the seas around 
Britain.  Second, it has tried to ensure that no hostile power had access to 
ports from which her command of those sea approaches could be 
challenged, and attacks on Britain itself could be launched – especially the 
channel ports of Northern France and the Low Countries.  Third, it did its 
best to ensure that no single major power dominated the continent of 
Europe.8  These three interests form an obvious concentric hierarchy in the 
geographical sense—from Britain’s immediate maritime approaches, moving 
to the closer shores of Europe, and then on to the continent as a whole.  But 
they also form a causal or policy hierarchy:  a balance of power on the 
Continent makes it easier to deny the Low Country ports to an enemy, and 
denying the channel ports makes it easier to dominate the Channel.  And 
they also form a clear hierarchy of priority:  while Britain has consistently 
tried to maintain a continental balance of power, it has placed higher priority 
on the security of the Channel ports, and highest of all on the fleet that 
guards the English Channel.  
The translation of these strategic interests into strategic objectives for British 
policy was pretty straightforward.  First, maintain naval [and later, air] forces 
sufficient to deny the English Channel and other sea approaches to hostile 
forces.  Second, support small neighbours on the European coast of the 
Channel against predatory major European powers.  Third, align with weaker 
powers to preserve a balance of power among Europe’s major states and 
ensure that none became dominant.  These precepts have determined 
British strategic policy for centuries.  They have left scope for deep 
differences over how best they could be achieved, especially between those 
who favoured a maritime strategy—traditionally the Tory view—and Whigs 
who believed that Britain had to be able to deploy major forces to fight on the 
continent.  But those debates about means have been framed within deep 
agreement about ultimate aims.9      
                                                 
8 As one might expect, the classical account of Britain’s strategic interests have probably never 
been better or more pithily expressed than by Winston Churchill.  In his The Second World War 
he quotes himself saying: “For four hundred years the foreign policy of England has been to 
oppose the strongest, most aggressive most dominating power on the Continent, and 
particularly to prevent the Low Countries falling into the hands of such a power.” Winston 
Churchill, The Second World War, vol. 1 (London: Cassell and Co, 1948), p. 162 
9 Some American strategists have also been attracted by the British model of ‘permanent 
interests’.  See for example George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy 1900-1950 (Chicago:  
University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 10.     
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The Basic Idea 
How might we apply the principles of Pitt and Palmerston to Australia in the 
21st century?  The methodological key to the British approach is to identify 
the specific factors which over the long term do most to influence the 
likelihood and seriousness of an armed attack.  So we need to ask what are 
the factors which most influence the risks and scale of long-term threat to 
Australia?  At present the risk of attack on Australia seems very low.  Our 
defence policy needs to ask: What makes that so, and hence what would 
need to change for the threat of attack on Australia to rise significantly?  
These factors, if we can identify them, should provide the key to Australia’s 
enduring strategic interests.  Once the question is posed in these terms, it is 
not very hard to sketch an answer.  Obviously lots of things contribute to 
Australia’s present security, including the quality of our relations with other 
countries.  But ultimately Australia today feels relatively secure from attack 
because of the distribution of military power around us. First, none of our 
close neighbours has the military capability to project forces across 
Australia’s air and sea approaches in the face of our current armed forces.  
Second, no major power that could challenge our control of our approaches 
has access to bases in our immediate neighbourhood from which they could 
project power against us.  Third, no major power in our wider region, or 
beyond, has the capacity to project forces into our region without meeting 
effective resistance from other major powers.  As long as these things 
remain true, Australia will remain secure from direct attack.  Conversely, if 
any of these factors changed, we would feel much less secure.  We have 
here, then, a first sketch of Australia’s enduring strategic interests. 
Can it be that easy?  These features of our international situation are so 
fundamental to our security, and so familiar to us, that we tend to take them 
for granted.  Consequently it can take some effort of imagination to 
recognise how they might be different.  But none of these factors is 
immutable, especially over the longer term.  Indonesia in future could build 
air and naval forces more capable than ours.  In time, a major Asian power 
like China could get access to military bases in Papua New Guinea (PNG).  
And in time Asia could become dominated by a single hegemonic power—
not the United States, but China, India or Japan—with the capacity to project 
power towards Australia without meeting major opposition.  None of these 
outcomes is by any means a certainty.  Indeed the reason we all think that a 
direct attack on Australia is very unlikely is that none of the key factors that 
underpin our security from direct attack seems very likely to change.  But our 
confidence in all these factors is primarily a reflection in our expectation that 
the international system in Asia today will continue to function for the next 
few decades much as it has for the last few decades.  Perhaps it will, but not 
much would need to change for any of the situations mentioned above to 
become much less improbable, and it is relatively easy to see how such a 
future could emerge from the trends we see around us today.  Finding ways 
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to help prevent such things happening is the basic task of Australian 
strategic policy. 
To some, perhaps, it may seem improbable that a conception of strategic 
interests dating back 500 years can be relevant to Australian defence policy 
over coming decades.  In particular, it might appear that technology has 
made geography much less important now than it was in the age of 
Elizabeth I.  In fact that is true to a much lesser extent than one might 
imagine.  The application of physical force remains an inherently special 
business: forces have to be deployed and sustained in space, and distance 
remains, as it was for Phillip of Spain, a decisive factor in the ability to launch 
and sustain military operations.  So far only ballistic missiles provide a 
means to deliver force free of constraints of distance, but they do so only a 
immense cost, and at a cost that increase very rapidly with range.  Their use 
at intercontinental ranges remains militarily ineffective unless they are 
carrying nuclear warheads, or have exceptionally valuable targets.  They do 
not change the basic strategic calculus.  Cyber warfare perhaps offers a 
more significant challenge to the spatial nature of conflict: how seriously we 
take cyber warfare in defence planning is a subject for another time, but 
suffice to say I think its impact has been exaggerated.   
Theory Into Practice 
The ideas that we adapted from Pitt and Palmerston underlay the 
development of the short account of Australia’s wider strategic interests 
provided in the 1997 Strategic Policy Review,10 and the revised, extended 
and more detailed description given in Chapter Four of the 2000 White 
Paper.11  The purpose of that chapter was specifically to lay the foundation 
for a broadly-based strategic policy by giving a more rigorous account than 
had previously been attempted of Australia’s wider strategic interests.  It built 
upon our initial ideas described above to identify five distinct strategic 
interests:  the defence of the direct approaches to the continent, the stability 
of the immediate neighbourhood, security in Southeast Asia, the strategic 
balance in the wider Asia-Pacific, and support for global security.  These 
interests were presented as a concentric hierarchy whose geographic 
ordering reflected—like the British model—both their relative priority, and a 
causal or practical hierarchy as well.  The allocation of priority according to 
proximity is qualified but quite explicit.  Defence 2000 explained: 
We have given highest priority to those interests closest to Australia.  In 
some circumstances a major crisis far from Australia may be more important 
to our future security than a minor problem close at hand.  But in general, 
the closer a crisis is to Australia, the more important it would probably be to 
                                                 
10 Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Strategic Policy (Canberra: Department of Defence, 
1997), p. 8.  
11 Commonwealth of Australia, Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force (Canberra: 
Department of Defence, 2000), Chapter 4. 
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our security, and the more likely we would be to be able to do something 
about it.12 
It might have added that the closer a problem is to Australia the less likely 
anyone else would be prepared to take the lead in responding to it, and the 
more directly it might affect the security of the continent itself.  Of course this 
‘concentric principle’ could never be more than a rough rule of thumb, but as 
a broad guide to setting priorities it seemed simple, effective, enduring and 
intuitively compelling.  It was also absolutely necessary: some basis for 
assigning priorities to the different interests was essential if they were to 
provide a basis for capabilities decisions.    
Moreover, to provide a successful foundation for defence decisions the 
White Paper’s account of Australia’s strategic interests had to be specific 
and explicit enough to allow the derivation of clear strategic objectives, 
operational options and ultimately capability priorities.  This required us to 
avoid evasions and circumlocutions as much as possible.  In a public 
document some ellipsis is inevitable, but we strove at least to provide the 
clearest statements we could of precisely what Australia’s security required. 
We took some deliberate risks in the process, because it seemed so 
important to say what we meant as clearly as possible.  The following 
paragraphs, however, may be useful in explaining the thinking that underlay 
the statements of strategic interests in Defence 2000 and the operational 
and force structure implications that were drawn from them.  
The highest-priority strategic interest in Defence 2000 was to sustain our 
ability to defend the continent from direct attack.  It embedded the traditional 
priority for the Defence of Australia at the heart of the new more expansive 
conception of Australia’s strategic interests.  Operationally it incorporated the 
judgement that most effective way to do this was by deny our air and sea 
approaches to hostile forces,13  and that denial operations should begin  
as far from our shores as possible, including in their homes bases, forward 
operating bases and in transit.  We would aim to seize the initiative and 
dictate the pace, location and intensity of operations.14 
What are the specific implications of these judgements for defence policy?  
Australia has traditionally enjoyed an unchallenged margin of superiority in 
air and naval capabilities in our region, but twenty or thirty years from now 
that might not be so.  If Indonesia’s economy grew strongly over coming 
decades it could afford forces which might challenge Australia’s unless we 
work hard to stay ahead.  Alternatively, a major change in regional order 
could see the highly-capable forces of one or more of Asia’s major powers 
operating in the approaches to Australia.  Such changes are not in 
                                                 
12 Ibid., Para 4.5, p. 29. 
13 Ibid., Para 4.7, p. 30. 
14 Ibid., Para 6.9, p. 48. 
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themselves very unlikely, especially if we look ahead twenty-five years.  
Australia’s military superiority over the kinds of forces we might meet in our 
own direct approaches is therefore not to be taken for granted, and 
preserving that superiority is our prime strategic interest.           
The second strategic interest identified in Defence 2000 was the stability of 
our immediate neighbourhood, and specifically the denial of bases close to 
Australia to potentially hostile major powers.  A key factor in Australia’s 
security has always been that, thanks to our remote location, no country with 
bases close to Australia has been capable of challenging our control of the 
continent’s air and sea approaches.  Conversely, any attempt to base forces 
close to Australia cannot help but appear threatening.  This is not a new 
idea.  Australia started thinking strategically about its own security in the late 
nineteenth century when colonial leaders became concerned that French 
and German colonies in Australia’s immediate region might provide bases 
for an attack on Australia.  In the language of the 2000 White Paper, people 
like Deakin wanted to ‘prevent the positioning in neighbouring states of 
foreign forces that might be used to attack Australia’.15  Their fears were 
realised in 1942. 
In 2000 we judged that any change in the international order that saw 
potentially hostile forces operating from bases in our immediate 
neighbourhood would significantly increase the risk of substantial, sustained 
direct attack by conventional armed forces on Australia.  Australia is too far 
from the home bases of any major power for them to be able to sustain 
operations in our approaches without access to bases close to hand.  With 
such bases, our maritime defences could be more easily overcome, and our 
ability to deny the continents approaches to an adversary eroded.  Denying 
an adversary such bases is therefore a key strategic interest, second only to 
the defence of Australia itself. 
Before turning to the implications of this interest for defence policy, it is first 
perhaps worth stressing that by identifying something as a strategic interest 
one is making no judgments about likelihood of some development or other; 
one is only saying that if it occurred it would have important implications for 
our security from armed attack.  There remains of course a separate 
question about the resources, financial and otherwise, that one might 
expend in protecting it: that would depend on judgements of probability, and 
of seriousness were it to be threatened.  In this present example, the 
likelihood of a potentially hostile power seeking bases in our neighbourhood 
is indeed remote.  But our focus here is on the possibility and implications of 
systemic change.  If, in time, active strategic competition developed between 
the United States and China, for example, the risk of major power intrusions 
into our neighbourhood would grow.  How unlikely is that over the next thirty 
years?      
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Australia’s strategic interest in the quarantine of our immediate 
neighbourhood has clear implications for our force structure and broader 
strategic policy.  First, it suggests that Australia needs military options to 
defend our small island neighbours from direct attack.  Moreover because 
their security is so important to Australia’s own, we might put a high priority 
on being able to defend them from a major adversary without the help of our 
allies.  Operationally this would best be done by denial of their air and sea 
approaches.  That suggests that we need forces, and access to bases, that 
can extend Australia’s ability to control its own air and sea approaches to 
those of its small island neighbours.  Diplomatically it underpins the 
importance of Australia’s security undertakings to PNG under the Joint 
Declaration of Principles, and the unilateral undertakings to support other 
island neighbours that were set out in Defence 2000.16  And it provides a 
robust strategic underpinning to the broader security and humanitarian 
motives for Australia to play a strong role in supporting internal stability and 
effective government among these weak and vulnerable states.17  The risk of 
internal instability increases the vulnerability of our neighbours to external 
pressure and intrusion, and we have a wider concern to promote strong and 
effective government among our neighbours which aligns with, but goes 
beyond, our strictly strategic interests.  This in turn may have major 
implications for Australia’s force needs.  
The third ring in the concentric hierarchy of interests set out in Defence 2000 
covered maritime Southeast Asia.  Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, 
Malaysia and Brunei together form the region ‘from or through’ which (as 
Paul Dibb famously wrote18) any major military conventional threat to 
Australia would most likely come.  Australia’s security in recent decades has 
been greatly strengthened by the stability of Southeast Asia.  We have a 
strong interest in that being preserved.  As Defence 2000 said: 
We would be concerned about any major external threat to the territorial 
integrity of the nations in our nearer region, especially in maritime Southeast 
Asia, whether that threat came from outside or inside the region.19  
What did this mean?  First, we omitted reference to the internal stability of 
these states, not because it was unimportant, but because, from a defence 
policy perspective, there seemed simply no realistic possibility that 
Australia’s military forces could do anything significant to help.  The focus of 
Australian strategic policy in Southeast Asia was therefore ‘major external 
                                                 
16 Ibid., Para 6.11, p. 48. 
17 For example, in recent years this view of Australia’s enduring strategic interests has been 
proposed as a key reason for deeper Australian engagement with small and vulnerable 
neighbours in two Australian Strategic Policy Institute reports.  See: Elsina Wainwright, Our 
Failing Neighbour: Australia and the Future of the Solomon Islands (Canberra: Australian 
Strategic Policy Institute, 2003); Elsina Wainwright, New Neighbour, New Challenge: Australia 
and the Security of East Timor (Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2002).  
18 Dibb, Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities, p. 48. 
19 Commonwealth of Australia, Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force, Para 4.9, p. 31. 
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threats’ from either inside or outside the region.  We reasoned first that 
Australia’s security would be seriously eroded if any of the larger countries of 
maritime Southeast Asia—most obviously Indonesia—tried to absorb or 
dominate smaller and weaker neighbours.  That means Australia has a 
strong and enduring interest in ensuring that no major act of military 
aggression by Indonesia—or any country in maritime Southeast Asia—
against any of its neighbours would be allowed to succeed.  Second, we 
believed that Australia had a key interest in preventing the strategic intrusion 
of any of Asia’s great powers into Maritime Southeast Asia as that would 
make it easier for them to project military power towards Australia.  Again, 
this idea has a long history: preventing Chinese, and before that Japanese, 
strategic intrusion into this region has been an enduing Australian strategic 
priority for decades.   
As a general principle, then, Australia has an enduring strategic interest in 
helping to prevent military aggression against our maritime Southeast Asian 
neighbours either from inside or outside the region.  The diplomatic 
implications are clear:  this interest underlies and justifies Australia’s 
continued commitment to the Five Power Defence Arrangements, under 
which we are committed to help defend Malaysia and Singapore against 
external attack.  It also provides the strategic rationale for a formal security 
agreement with Indonesia, problematic thought that concept has proved.  
What of the implications for capabilities?  We judged that Australia would not 
intervene in a conflict in Southeast Asia without at least the support of the 
country being attacked, but that we might want options to support a regional 
coalition to resist aggression in which the United States was not involved.  
Australia might therefore need to lead such a regional coalition.  We would 
want to be able to make a substantial contribution to a coalition force—and 
by substantial we mean one that was large enough to make a real 
operational difference to the outcome.  Our forces would need to be able to 
undertake major independent operations within a coalition campaign, 
operating from bases in the region provided by our regional coalition 
partners. 
Perhaps the most obvious foundation of Australia’s security in recent 
decades has been the maintenance of a stable strategic balance between 
Asia’s major powers, based on the continued primacy of the United States in 
the Western Pacific.  It would be tempting to say that our principle interest in 
the wider security of Asia is simply to sustain US strategic engagement as 
the dominant maritime power, but in drafting Defence 2000 we thought this 
would confuse ends with means.  Australia’s primary interest is in the stable 
strategic balance itself.  The US presence in Asia is the primary means 
through which that interest is sustained.20  In 2000 it seemed there were two 
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ways that our interest in a stable strategic balance in Asia might be upset.  
One is the emergence of a single hegemonic power in Asia which, if not 
balanced and constrained by other powers, might be free to use or threaten 
force against smaller counties like Australia.  The other is the emergence of 
an active and sustained strategically-adversarial relationship between two or 
more of Asia’s major powers.21  For example, acute strategic competition 
between China and Japan would most probably include competition for 
bases and allies in maritime Southeast Asia, raising significantly the risk of 
major power penetration into our nearer region or even our immediate 
neighbourhood.   
What can Australia do to protect our interest in preventing any of these bad 
outcomes?  As long as America plays a key strategic role in Asia, the best 
way to support our interests in the Asian power balance will be to support 
them.  This provides the core rationale for our commitments to the United 
States under ANZUS.  The alliance helps to underpin the United States 
stabilising role in Asia, but it also creates an imperative to encourage the 
United States, Japan and China to preserve their stable strategic 
relationships of recent decades in the face of rapidly changing power 
relativities.  Our interest in Asian stability therefore carries big implications 
for Australia’s strategic diplomacy.  There are also implications for forces 
structure.  Disastrous as a US-China conflict would be, Australia clearly 
needs options to support the United States militarily if such a conflict breaks 
out.  In 2000 we judged that this is the only circumstance in which Australia 
would become engaged in an Asian major-power conflict beyond maritime 
Southeast Asia.  Australia’s military effort would be limited to a contribution 
to a larger coalition led by the United States.  However to do justice to the 
scale of Australian interests that would be engaged, our commitment would 
need to be significant—much larger, for example, than we have sent to the 
Gulf in successive coalition operations.  Australia’s strategic objectives in a 
Northeast Asian conflict threatening Asia’s major-power balance would go 
beyond the mere demonstration of support for our ally.  We would have a 
critical interest in how the conflict was conducted and concluded, because 
this would profoundly affect Australia’s future strategic environment.  Our 
strategic objective would therefore be to achieve real influence over the way 
the United States conducted and concluded the conflict, and we would 
therefore want to have operational options available to contribute forces that 
would be sufficiently significant to the US effort to give us that level of 
influence—much as the UK has tried to do in the Gulf in recent years.  That 
                                                                                                                   
 
primarily not on the alliance with the United States but on equilibrium among the great powers in 
Asia and the Pacific”.  Hedley Bull, ‘Australia and the Great Powers in Asia’, in Gordon 
Greenwood and Norman Harper (eds.), Australia in World Affairs 1966-1970 (Melbourne: 
Cheshire/AIIA, 1974), p. 349.            
21 Commonwealth of Australia, Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force, Para 4.10 
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suggests we need to build forces that are capable of making that kind of 
contribution—a demanding task.   
The fifth level of the hierarchy of strategic interests developed in the 2000 
White Paper was global.  Australia has many security and humanitarian 
interests at the global level, some of which have been pursued trough the 
deployment of armed forces.  But in narrowly strategic terms, Australia’s 
security from direct attack is shaped by global developments because our 
Asian strategic environment and our own bilateral alliances are shaped by 
them.  The capacity of our allies to help Australia has depended on their 
ability to manage competing strategic pressures elsewhere, and our allies’ 
willingness to support us has depended on Australia being seen as 
supporting them in their fights elsewhere.  We have often also recognised an 
interest at the global level in supporting global norms and institutions that 
offer a prospect of reducing the risk to Australia from armed conflict.  At 
those times when the UN has seemed to offer such prospects, we have seen 
a genuine strategic interest in supporting it.     
What kinds of military operations does Australia need to undertake to serve 
these global strategic interests and objectives?  In the two world wars 
Australia deployed forces to global theatres which had the capacity to make 
a genuine strategic impact.  But since 1945—and arguably since 1942—
Australia has preserved its strategic interests with small, primarily symbolic 
deployments.  Australia needs the capacity to contribute small contingents to 
US-led coalitions and UN-sponsored operations around the world.  In the 
2000 White Paper we said:   
Beyond the Asia-Pacific region, we would normally consider only a relatively 
modest contribution to any wider UN or US-led coalition…22   
Next Steps 
We did not presume in 2000 that our formulation of Australia’s enduring 
strategic interests would prove to be the last word on the subject.  We had 
no doubt that a lot more work would be needed to build a stable and durable 
understanding of the factors that determine Australia’s security to provide the 
basis for Australian defence planning.  We did however believe that this 
‘interests-driven’ approach to defence policy provided a better basis for 
decisions about long-term capability choices than any of others that had 
been proposed.  The challenge for students and practitioners of defence 
policy alike is to either contribute to refining our understanding of Australia’s 
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enduring strategic interests,23 or to propose a better way to answer the 
question: ‘what do we want our armed forces to be able to do?’ 
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